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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW:

by Sallyanne Payton

he community of administrative law teachers
and scholars seems to be in perpetual doubt
over how "administrative law" should be
approached as a branch of legal doctrine, and,
indeed, whether the subject exists at all. At its core,
"administrative law" is a collection of abstract, even
pithy, principles that purport to describe and predict
the bases on which judges review agency action.
For example, agency decisions are to be supported by
"substantial evidence" or are not to be "abitrary and
capricious" and are to have "a reasonable basis in
law"; agencies must accord "due process" when they
inflict deprivations of life, liberty, or property, and so
on. Any experienced lawyer knows, however, that
the actual content of these principles cannot be com-

prehended except by observing how they are applied
to particular actions by particular agencies. Administrative law can only be understood in its native
disorderly profusion; doctrinal synthesis and rationalization, the mainstays of traditional legal
scholarship, may be not only futile in this area but
actually misleading, an observation that has led
observers to question whether there really is an
encompassing subject known as "administrative
law."
These observations are now commonplace. It is
widely acknowledged that the principles of administrative law are distinguished for their malleability
and that the actual outcomes of cases involving challenges to agency action depend on, among other
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ver since the flowering of
government regulation during the
N ev.1 Deal, H has been apparent that
judicial review alone, or even in
combination with legislative
oversight, is inadequate to curb
abuses of administrative discretion.

things, the nature of the government activity under
review, the professional reputation of particular
agencies and even of particular administrators and
administrative law judges, the apparent soundness of
the agencies' own decisional process, courts' willingness to grapple with the substance of the agencies'
work, and their taste for reviewing agency records,
which are frequently voluminous.
Consequently, some agencies tend to be reviewed
more stiffly than others; and some subjects-notably
major rulemaking activity in the areas of health and
safety regulation and environmental protectiontend to stimulate a higher degree of judicial interest
than does the routine activity.
Because of the close relationship between the
nature of an agency's activity and the nature of the
judicial review to which it is likely to be subjected,
administrative law scholarship must have one foot in
public policy. Indeed, it is nearly impossible to
appreciate the interplay of politics, government, and
law in the administrative state without specializing
in some substantive area of public law in which policy and legal principles are shaped by an agency.
This means that administrative law teaching and
scholarship mainly focus away from the judicial system, not on it. Even the continuing controversies
respecting the institutional role of the courts in overseeing the work of the agencies tend to focus on the
agencies themselves, since it is their peculiar role
in making law that gives rise to judicial deference or
disquiet. Administrative law is mainly about agencies, not mainly about courts.
There is a good practical reason for centering the
discipline on the work of the agencies. Ever since the
flowering of government regulation during the New
Deal, it has been apparent that judicial review alone,
or even in combination with legislative oversight, is
inadequate to discipline administrative discretion.
These oversight mechanisms operate episodically
and largely consist of review or criticism after the
fact. If the agencies are to be influenced decisively,
they must be affected directly and prospectivelythat is, through statute and regulation. The federal
government and nearly all the states have general
administrative procedure acts; and legislatures tinker
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periodically with procedures affecting particular programs. A very large proportion of administrative
law scholarly activity is now devoted to the study
and improvement of administrative procedure, particularly at the federal level.
Much of the writing on administrative law, mired
as it is in disputation over the details of administrative procedure, lacks dash. The general reader can
hardly be expected to appreciate the intensity of conflict over such issues as, to take a current example,
the certification of 'contract claims brought against the
federal government; but the tedium is deceptive.
Procedures are power; they may assist or hinder the
agencies in accomplishing their missions, may force
agencies to redefine their missions or their constituencies, may provide visibility into decision-making
processes and thus facilitate political accountability,
and so on.
Once the relationship between procedure and
power is appreciated, the political content of even the
most apparently boring administrative law scholarship becomes manifest. Preferences for one type of
decision maker or process over another are at base
political preferences, which regularly escape the
bounds of technical legalistic argumentation and
become the subject of explicit ideological conflict. In
recent years, for example, Presidents Carter and
Reagan have both brought administrative procedural
reform to the level of presidential politics.
Administrative law and procedure are thus unabashedly associated with politics and government,
which helps to account for their awkward posture
within a legal system that finds it generally useful to
camouflage the relationship between law and political
authority. In administrative law, political ideas are
on the surface of, as well as at the heart of, the law.
In this regard, administrative law is kin to constitutional law, a similarly politicized subject. In fact,
administrative law can best be thought of as the collection of principles of which the idea of government
under law, an idea older and more basic than the
written American constitution itself, is effectuated in
practice.
Administrative law attempts to reconcile the practical realities of the administrative state with two
central propositions on which the government itself
is founded: first, that the laws of a free people are
anchored in the consent of the governed as expressed
by its elected representatives; and second, that no
matter how legitimate its short-term political authority the government must act in accordance with the
higher and more enduring requirements of the rule
of law, which preserves the individual liberty that
makes democratic self-governance conceivable.
Thus, administrative law concentrates on ensuring
that government officials act only within the scope
of their lawful authority and adhere to minimum
standards of fairness and rationality in dealing with
those subject to their power. Since the government is
an active force, administrative law tends to reflect

current political controversies. The development of
administrative law can fairly be characterized as a
collective scramble by the judiciary to keep up with
what the government is doing and to civilize executive branch officials who are inclined to tear the
fabric of fundamental law in their pursuit of immediate programmatic or political gains.
The consequence of judicial review of agency
action is that in administrative law, as in constitutional law, the behavior of the courts is openly
political, whether they help government along by
moderating and legitimizing the exercise of managerial discretion or whether they obstruct and
delegitimize it. In both constitutional and administrative law, the politically independent judiciary has
the capacity to retard or reject the work of the politically accountable branches in the name of political
values that transcend the daily exigencies of representative government.
Administrative law scholarship is perforce
obsessed with the big issues. For example, imposing
legalistic requirements on agencies tends to inhibit
their managerial discretion, to impair their effectiveness in carrying out their programs, and to reduce
their political responsiveness. One cannot make an
intelligent argument for or against requiring agencies
to abide by legally enforceable procedural or intellectual standards without having general views on the
propriety of judicial oversight of administration, on
the appropriate balance between meticulousness and
effectiveness in the work of the particular agency,
and on the proper role of the agencies in the political
system.
Reforms designed to enhance citizen participation
in the administrative process, to force agencies to
disclose information in their possession, to advertise
their intended rules and to allow adversary challenge
to them, to engage in procedures that preserve the
appearance of care and impartiality, are all to be
measured for their net contribution to responsible
and rational governance, as are contrary reforms
designed to eliminate such requirements in the name
of reducing government bureaucracy and regulation.
If there are any themes that cut across discrete regulatory areas and can be considered as the true subject
of general "administrative law," they are these large
problems of achieving the proper mix of legality,
political legitimacy, accountability and effectiveness
in the administrative process. One backs inexorably
into the large issues, no matter how tiny the topic
with which one began.
While the big issues are implicit in administrative
law controversies, not all good administrative law
scholarship deals with them at a high level of
abstraction. The grand problems of administrative
legitimacy and authority can only be appreciated in
the context of particular regulatory morasses. The
problems of the National Park Service bear virtually
no resemblance to the problems of the Social Security
Administration, even though both agencies are gov-
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he grand problems of
administrative legitimacy and
authority can only be appreciated in
the context of particular regulatory
morasses.

erned ostensibly by the same body of "administrative
law."
Consequently, administrative law does not lend
itself to broad precocious theorizing. Being an aspect
of the art of governing, it represents a union of experience, insight, and theory, and requires mastery of ·
whopping amounts of factual information about particular government activities. Because the subject
matter itself unites theory and practice, the best
administrative law theory climbs out of empiricism.
Professor Jerry Mashaw's interesting theoretical
models of due process in administrative adjudication,
for example, are informed thoroughly by his decadelong involvement with the particular problem of
deciding Social Security disability claims. 1
This comes out to be a paradox. Administrative
law involves some of the most interesting theoretical
problems of governance; yet the actual developmer.t
of the law occurs in the context of specific issues
arising under complicated regulatory schemes. To the
reader of the case reports, it may seem that there is
no middle ground between the courts' articulation of
meaninglessly abstract principles of judicial review
and their dive into particularistic examination of the
facts and reasoning supporting the agency decisions
under review. Intermediate doctrinal analysis, the
usual mainstay of judicial reasoning, is virtually
absent in administrative law opinions.
Even if the courts are trapped in the format of
individual case analysis, however, administrative law
scholarship is not so confined. Where administrative
law scholarship seems to be headed is toward a better understanding of the craft of governing.
Increasingly in recent years the community of
administrative law scholars has taken its obligatory
focus on the agencies as a reason for pride. Materials
on judicial review have been moved to the backs of
the casebooks; the agencies' own procedures are
being showcased and their decision-making processes examined. Some administrative law
scholarship is reaching for closer ties with political
theory, sociology, organization theory, and, in
accordance with the trends of the time, economics, in
an effort to achieve insight into agency behavior.
Perhaps out of a need to compensate for the limited
opportunities for mid-level doctrinal analysis in
administrative law, some younger scholars are turning toward model building as a technique of
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generating conceptual insights that cut across discrete
regulatory schemes. Jerry Mashaw's models of due
process have already been mentioned. Colin Diver of
Boston University has blended doctrinal analysis
with organizational theory, inferring from judicial
opinions the models of administrative decision making that ~eem to reside in the minds of judges. 2
These mtellectual currents may over time push
administrative law scholarship even further away
from traditional doctrinal analysis into the arms of
social science and political theory; but the movement
is enriching. Administrative law purports to be based
on insight into the nature of government; if the pragmatic insight of experienced lawyers and judges can
be made more accurate by the infusion of more systematic learning from other disciplines, then surely
the law will be made more intelligently.
There is little or no danger, however, that administrative law will be taken over by the organizational
theorists (as the economists are attempting to claim
the whole of regulatory policy). For so long as judges
continue to review agency action, administrative
law and procedure will continue to be the special
province of lawyers, whose comparative advantage
over other students of public policy lies in their
appreciation of the relationship between procedure
and power.
Nor is legal doctrine, or the traditional role of legal
scholarship in describing, synthesizing, and rationalizing the law, yet dead or irrelevant. The
administrative law community still has need of
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thoughtful traditional scholarship, particularly work
th?t ~lerts that practitioners to generally applicable
prmc1ples that may be developing in areas removed
~ram the~r _own. While the competence of the practicmg admm1strative law bar is awesome
administ~ative law being the meat and potatoes of
the_ Washmgton legal establishment, extreme specialization means that many lawyers confine their
?ttention to narrow areas and may not appreciate the
mtellectu_al currents blowing in the general legal
community.
In a~~i~ion, broadly descriptive doctrinal analysis
and cntic1sm that focuses explicitly on political ideology may be due for a revival. The conservatives of
the Burger Court have resurrected old-fashioned liberal and populist objections to the administrative
stat: and have revived the non-delegation doctrine.
Their tum toward literalism in statutory construction
has eroded the tradition of judicial deference toward
agencies' interpretation of their own statutes. The
tenor of the conservatives' opinions suggests that
they would reduce the influence of the federal courts
on the agencies and would force Congress to control
them more closely through legislation.
This development is occurring in the context of a
general resurgence of interest in federalism issues. As
governmental power shifts toward state and local
governments and private voluntary organizations, the
attention of administrative lawyers must follow.
Administrative law scholarship thus has new fields
to plow.These are times that recall administrative
law to its original task, midway between law and
politics, of civilizing the exercise of power. It is a fertile time for administrative law scholars.
1

Professor Payton, who· te~ches administrative law and
regulatory policy at Michigan, serves as a public member
of the Administrative Conference of the United States.
This article was written for Law Quadrangle Notes.
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